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Abstract	::	Emotions	can	be	understood	generally	from	two	different	perspectives:	(i)	a	third-person	perspective	that	specifies	their	distinctive	functional	role	within	our	overall	cognitive	economy	and	(ii)	a	first-person	perspective	that	attempts	to	capture	their	distinctive	phenomenal	character,	the	subjective	quality	of	experiencing	them.	One	emotion	that	is	of	central	importance	in	many	ethical	systems	is	respect	(in	the	sense	of	respect	for	persons	or	so-called	recognition-respect).	However,	discussions	of	respect	in	analytic	moral	philosophy	have	tended	to	focus	almost	entirely	on	its	functional	role,	in	particular	the	behaviors	that	respect	disposes	us	to	engage	in	(or	refrain	from).	Here	we	wish	to	investigate	the	phenomenal	character	of	respect,	what	it	is	like	to	feel	respect	for	persons.	Since	Kant	is	the	reference	point	for	modern	discussions	of	respect,	we	try	to	reconstruct	Kant’s	account	of	the	phenomenology	of	respect,	but	endeavoring	to	refine	his	account	in	light	of	our	own	phenomenological	observations.					
1.	Respect	and	Moral	Phenomenology		In	the	opening	chapter	of	his	book	The	Conscious	Mind,	David	Chalmers	(1996)	argues	that	many	mental	terms	lead	a	“double	life”:	they	have	a	psychological	life	and	a	phenomenological	life.	To	say	that	a	term	T	leads	a	double	life	is	to	say	that	T-tokens	tend	to	cluster	into	two	distinct	types,	each	expressing	a	different	concept.	Thus,	we	use	the	word	“pain”	in	two	discernibly	different	ways,	which	express	two	different	concepts,	which	we	may	call	the	psychological	concept	of	pain	and	a	phenomenological	concept	of	pain.	These	concepts	may	or	may	not	pick	out	the	same	property,	but	however	that	turns	out,	they	are	distinct	concepts.2		
																																																								
1 This	chapter	is	thoroughly	collaborative;	the	order	of	authorship	is	alphabetical.	Work	for	it	was	supported	by	the	French	National	Research	Agency’s	grants	ANR-11-0001-02	PSL*	and	ANR-10-LABX-0087. 2	Chalmers	himself	thinks	they	turn	out	to	also	pick	out	different	properties,	but	this	does	not	fall	out	of	the	thesis	of	the	double	life	of	mental	terms.	The	argument	for	it	arrives	rather	later	in	the	book	
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	 What	are	these	notions	of	“psychological	concept”	and	“phenomenological	concept”?	According	to	Chalmers,	mental	phenomena	can	be	conceived	either	in	terms	of	their	functional	role	within	the	subject’s	psychological	economy,	or	in	terms	of	their	phenomenal	character,	what	it	is	like	for	their	subject	to	undergo	them.	The	psychological	conception	of	mind	characterizes	mental	phenomena	third-personally	in	terms	of	their	causal	relations	to	each	other	and	to	the	environment;	the	phenomenological	conception	characterizes	them	first-personally	in	terms	of	their	phenomenal	or	subjective	feel.	Thus	the	former	focuses	on	the	mechanical	dimension	of	mental	life,	the	latter	on	its	experiential	dimension.	Most	mental	terms,	suggests	Chalmers,	can	be	understood	either	as	expressing	a	third-person,	functional-role	conception	of	the	relevant	mental	phenomenon	or	as	expressing	a	first-person,	phenomenal-character	conception	of	it.	Thus,	mental	states	can	be	classified	as	pains	either	because	(roughly)	they	are	caused	by	harmful	stimulation	and	cause	aversive	reaction	or	because	they	feel	that	particular	unpleasant	way	–	they	hurt.	Correspondingly,	the	term	“pain”	can	be	used	to	express	either	(i)	the	concept	of	a	mental	state	caused	by	harmful	stimulation	and	causative	of	aversive	reaction	or	(ii)	the	concept	of	a	mental	state	that	feels	that	unpleasant	way.	The	former	is	the	psychological	concept	of	pain,	the	latter	the	phenomenological	concept	of	pain.3	The	double-life	thesis	seems	particularly	compelling	for	the	emotions.	Fear	tends	to	be	triggered	by	objects	or	events	that	appear	dangerous,	and	tends	to	provoke	characteristic	reactions	of	fight	or	flight;	these	causes	and	effects	of	fear	are	publicly	observable	and	third-personally	describable.	But	fear	also	feels	a	certain	unmistakable	way,	a	way	it	is	much	harder	to	describe	in	public	language;	when	any	token	conscious	fear	occurs,	only	one	person	experiences	the	relevant	instance	of	that	feeling.	Crucially,	it	is	unclear	how	one	could	“read	off”	the	phenomenal	character	of	fear	from	a	complete	specification	of	fear’s	functional	role.	Likewise,																																																																																																																																																																						(mostly	Ch.	2).	The	purview	of	the	double-life	thesis	thus	concerns,	in	the	first	place,	only	the	realm	of	concepts.		3	Unless	we	recognize	this	ambiguity	of	“pain,”	we	are	liable	to	fall	into	puzzle	and	paradox.	Thus,	when	a	toothached	subject	must	suddenly	attend	to	a	fire	in	the	kitchen	and	no	longer	feels	her	toothache,	does	it	still	qualify	as	pain?	When	she	feels	again	the	toothache	after	the	fire	has	been	put	out,	is	she	feeling	the	same	pain	as	before	or	a	new,	numerically	distinct	pain?	Such	questions	are	readily	answered	once	we	distinguish	between	the	psychological	and	the	phenomenological	concepts	of	pain.	When	we	do,	it	becomes	straightforward	that	unfelt	pain	qualifies	as	pain	in	the	psychological	sense	but	not	in	the	phenomenological	sense,	and	accordingly,	our	subject	has	the	same	pain	throughout	in	the	psychological	sense	but	two	different	pains	in	the	phenomenological	sense.	The	underlying	reason	is	that	while	the	subject’s	toothache-related	state	during	the	fire	preserves	much	of	the	functional	role	it	had	before	the	fire,	it	loses	its	phenomenal	character	entirely.	(At	least	this	is	what	the	description	of	the	case	as	involving	unfelt	pain	suggests.	One	might	of	course	contest	this	description,	with	different	implications	arising	for	what	to	say	about	such	cases.)		
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anger	tends	to	be	triggered	by	wrongs,	slights,	etc.	and	to	provoke	a	pull	to	rectification	and/or	revenge.	But	in	addition,	it	involves	a	distinctive,	unpleasantly	consuming	subjective	feeling	or	experience,	which	appears	to	go	beyond	functional	role.	Thus	fear	and	anger	can	be	conceptualized	in	two	systematically	distinct	ways:	in	terms	of	functional	role	or	in	terms	of	phenomenal	character.	That	is,	they	can	be	conceptualized	either	psychologically	or	phenomenologically.	Similar	remarks	apply	in	all	likelihood	to	most	other	emotions.4	
ge	Among	the	emotions	most	central	to	ethical	theory	is	respect.	Of	particular	significance	is	the	kind	of	respect	highlighted	by	Kant	–	what	is	sometimes	called	“respect	for	persons	as	such.”	This	is	the	respect	we	have	toward	someone	not	because	of	her	particular	accomplishments	or	attributes,	but	simply	because	she	is	a	person.	It	is	the	kind	of	respect	we	have	toward	x	when	x’s	being	a	person	is	sufficient	ground	for	our	respecting	x.		 If	the	double-life	thesis	is	on	the	right	track,	such	respect	can	be	conceptualized	in	two	different	ways.	On	the	one	hand,	it	can	be	characterized	third-personally	in	terms	of	its	distinctive	functional	role	in	our	psychological	economy,	the	kinds	of	causes	and	effects	that	tend	to	trigger	it	and	tend	to	be	provoked	by	it.	To	seek	the	right	such	characterization	is	to	engage	in	the	moral	psychology	of	
respect	for	persons.	On	the	other	hand,	this	kind	of	respect	can	also	be	characterized	first-personally	in	terms	of	its	distinctive	phenomenal	character,	the	subjective	experience	of	occurrently	feeling	respect	for	a	person.	To	seek	the	right	first-personal	characterization	of	respect’s	phenomenal	character	is	to	engage	in	the	
moral	phenomenology	of	respect	for	persons.			 In	analytic	moral	philosophy,	by	far	the	most	contributions	to	our	understanding	of	respect	for	persons	have	come	from	moral	psychology,	not	moral	
phenomenology.	Thus,	in	his	seminal	“Two	Kinds	of	Respect,”	Stephen	Darwall																																																									4	There	are	in	fact	three	features	traditionally	thought	to	make	up	the	core	of	mental	life:	functional	role,	phenomenal	character,	and	intentional	content.	The	psychological	conception	of	mind	focuses	on	the	first,	the	phenomenological	conception	on	the	second.	What	about	the	third?	Is	there	also	an	intentional	conception	of	mind?	Such	a	conception	could	very	likely	be	formulated,	but	in	the	present	context	it	would	be	more	profitable	to	note	that	the	notion	of	intentionality	itself	splits	in	two.	On	the	one	hand,	we	have	the	notion	of	intentionality	as	based	on	functional	role,	perhaps	long-armed	role	that	includes	connections	to	the	environment	and	actions	(Harman	1987).	On	the	other	hand,	there	is	also	the	notion	of	intentionality	as	based	on	satisfaction	conditions	constituted	by	phenomenal	character	(Horgan	and	Tienson	2002,	Loar	2003).	In	light	of	this,	we	might	just	distinguish	two	kinds	of	intentionality	–	psychological	intentionality	and	phenomenal	intentionality	–	and	to	build	the	former	into	the	psychological	conception	of	mind	and	the	latter	into	the	phenomenological	conception	(Kriegel	2010).		
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(1977)	isolates	a	kind	of	respect	he	calls	“recognition-respect,”	which	he	distinguishes	from	“appraisal-respect”	and	characterizes	as	follows:		There	is	a	kind	of	respect	which	…	consists,	most	generally,	in	a	disposition	to	weigh	appropriately	in	one’s	deliberations	some	feature	of	the	thing	in	question	and	to	act	accordingly…	To	say	that	persons	as	such	are	entitled	to	respect	[of	this	kind]	is	to	say	that	they	are	entitled	to	have	other	persons	take	seriously	and	weigh	appropriately	the	fact	that	they	are	persons	in	deliberating	about	what	to	do.	Such	respect	is	recognition	respect…	(Darwall	1977:	38)	It	is	clear	that	what	Darwall	has	in	mind	with	his	notion	of	recognition-respect	is	what	we	have	called	above	respect	for	persons	–	or	at	least	that	respect	for	persons	is	a	special	case	of	recognition-respect	(namely,	the	case	where	the	fact	recognized	is	that	someone	is	a	person).	But	it	is	also	clear	that	what	Darwall	has	in	mind	is	a	phenomenon	characterized	in	terms	of	functional	role.	This	becomes	evident	when	Darwall	offers	his	fuller	account	of	recognition-respect:		Some	fact	or	feature	is	an	appropriate	object	of	[recognition]	respect	if	inappropriate	consideration	or	weighing	of	that	fact	or	feature	would	result	in	behavior	that	is	morally	wrong.	To	respect	something	is	thus	to	regard	it	as	requiring	restrictions	on	the	moral	acceptability	of	actions	connected	with	it…	To	have	such	respect	for	the	law,	say,	is	to	be	disposed	to	regard	the	fact	that	something	is	the	law	as	restricting	the	class	of	actions	that	would	be	morally	permissible.	(Darwall	1977:	43)	This	account	of	recognition-respect	clearly	proceeds	by	trying	to	correctly	identify	an	attitude	with	a	distinctive	functional	role.5	Respect	for	persons	is	said	to	be	that	mental	state	which	is	triggered	by	persons	(or	objects	appearing	to	one	to	be	persons)	and	which	provokes	a	narrowing-down	of	the	potential	courses	of	action	toward	those	objects	(and	does	so	in	light	of	these	objects	appearing	to	be	persons).			 Other	treatments	of	respect	in	the	extant	literature	follow	a	very	similar	pattern,	disagreeing	among	them	mostly	on	the	correct	analysis	of	respect’s	functional	role.	We	do	not	wish	to	call	into	question	the	insight	into	the	nature	of	respect	afforded	by	such	analyses.	We	suspect,	however,	that	there	is	an	additional	and	complementary	kind	of	insight	into	respect	that	could	be	had,	one	obtained	by	articulation	of	the	phenomenal	character	of	respect	–	what	it	is	like	for	us	to	occurrently	experience	respect	for	someone	solely	on	account	of	her	being	a	person.	We	suspect,	moreover,	that	here	too,	the	subjective	quality	of	respect	cannot	be	“read	off”	from	any	specification	of	respect’s	functional	role,	however	exhaustive.	A	full	portrait	of	respect	for	persons	would	thus	comprise	both	a	psychological																																																									5	Moreover,	the	attitude	in	question	is,	for	Darwall,	precisely	the	attitude	Kant	had	in	mind	in	discussing	respect:	“it	is	to	recognition	respect	of	persons	that	Kant	refers	when	he	writes,	‘Such	a	being	is	therefore	an	object	of	respect	and,	so	far,	restricts	all	(arbitrary)	choice’”	(Darwall	1977:	45).		
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chapter	and	phenomenological	chapter,	tracing	out	both	the	functional	role	and	the	phenomenal	character	characteristic	of	this	attitude.	Since	the	literature	has	tended	to	focus	on	the	moral	psychology	of	respect,	here	we	focus	on	the	moral	phenomenology	of	respect.		
ge	The	literature’s	focus	on	functional	role	is	not	accidental.	There	is	a	sustained	worry	that	first-person	inquiry	into	phenomenal	feel	is	bound	to	run	into	principled	difficulties.	Thus,	the	deliverances	of	introspection	of	our	lived	experience	are	often	thought	to	be	untrustworthy.	In	addition,	it	is	unclear	how	we	might	put	into	words	those	deliverances,	whatever	their	epistemic	status.	It	is	a	familiar	refrain	in	discussions	of	conscious	experience,	after	all,	that	phenomenal	character	is	ultimately	ineffable,	or	perhaps	more	accurately	incommunicable:	it	can	be	named,	but	it	cannot	be	described.	No	informative	account	of	the	phenomenal	character	of	seeing	yellow	can	be	offered	to	the	colorblind.	By	the	same	token,	one	might	claim,	no	informative	account	of	what	it	is	like	to	feel	respect	could	be	offered	to	someone	constitutionally	incapable	of	feeling	it.	If	so,	it	is	unclear	how	moral	phenomenology	could	contribute	anything	substantial	to	our	understanding	of	respect.			 We	have	addressed	elsewhere	some	of	these	foundational	issues	stalking	moral	phenomenology	and	indeed	phenomenology	writ	large	(Horgan	and	Timmons	2005,	2008,	Kriegel	2008,	2015	inter	alia).	Heeding	the	precept	that	the	proof	is	in	the	pudding,	however,	here	we	would	like	to	consider	what	kind	of	phenomenological	pudding	could	be	made	of	respect	for	persons!	We	propose	to	simply	go	ahead	with	the	project	of	characterizing	the	phenomenal	character	of	such	respect,	with	the	hope	that	the	very	possibility	of	intelligible	discussion	of	the	topic	would	constitute	a	retroactive	partial	demonstration	of	the	project’s	viability.	Before	starting,	however,	some	general	remarks	might	prove	useful.			 In	mathematics,	an	axiomatic	system’s	primitives	are	officially	taken	to	be	incommunicable.	Nonetheless,	they	are	thought	to	be	understood	informally	in	terms	of	their	theoretical	role	within	the	relevant	system.	Thus,	notions	appearing	in	the	theorems	of	a	given	axiomatization	of	Euclidean	Geometry	are	defined	in	terms	of	notions	appearing	in	the	system’s	axioms;	but	the	notions	appearing	in	the	axioms	are	understood	only	in	terms	of	their	role	within	these	axioms	(Hilbert	1900).	Indeed,	the	axioms	can	be	thought	of	as	nothing	more	than	descriptions	of	a	web	of	interrelations	among	opaque	nodes,	with	each	node	designated	by	a	different	conceptually	primitive	notion.	Our	grasp	on	the	nature	of	these	nodes	is	exhausted	by	the	interrelations	specified	in	these	axioms.	These	theoretical	roles	can	be	articulated	most	straightforwardly	using	Ramsey	sentences:	sentences	asserting	the	
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existence	of	something	that	satisfies	a	vast	collection	of	descriptors	(Lewis	1966,	1972).			 This	approach	could	be	imported	into	moral	phenomenology,	with	central	phenomenological	observations	regarding	some	types	of	moral	experience	taking	the	role	of	the	axioms	in	a	mathematical	system.	Consider,	if	only	for	the	sake	of	illustration,	the	following	collection	of	broadly	phenomenological	observations	about	respect,	harvested	more	or	less	verbatim	from	the	Stanford	Encyclopedia	entry	on	respect	(Dillon	2014):		
• Respect	is	a	particular	mode	of	apprehending	the	object:	the	person	who	respects	something	pays	attention	to	it	and	perceives	it	differently.	
• Respect	often	feels	like	trying	to	see	the	object	clearly,	as	it	really	is	in	its	own	right,	and	not	seeing	it	solely	through	the	filter	of	one’s	own	desires	and	fears	or	likes	and	dislikes.	
• Respect	feels	object-generated	rather	than	wholly	subject-generated,	something	that	is	owed	to,	called	for,	deserved,	elicited,	or	claimed	by	the	object.		
• Respect	feels	deliberate,	a	matter	of	directed	rather	than	grabbed	attention,	of	reflective	consideration	and	judgment.	
• Respect	involves	“a	deontic	experience”	–	the	experience	that	one	must	pay	attention	and	respond	appropriately.	
• We	respect	something	not	because	we	want	to	but	because	we	recognize	that	we	have	to	respect	it.	
• Respect	is	the	recognition	of	something	“as	directly	determining	our	will	without	reference	to	what	is	wanted	by	our	inclinations”	(Rawls	2000:	153).	
• Respect	feels	reason-governed:	it	feels	like	we	cannot	respect	a	particular	object	for	just	any	old	reason	or	for	no	reason	at	all.	
• Respect	feels	universalizing,	in	the	sense	that	if	F	is	a	respect-warranting	feature	of	object	O,	then	respecting	O	on	account	of	F	commits	us,	other	things	equal,	to	respecting	other	things	that	also	have	feature	F.	A	comprehensive	moral	phenomenology	of	respect	would	involve	a	great	many	observations	of	this	sort,	which	could	then	be	‘Ramsified’	to	capture	the	theoretical	role	of	the	experience	of	respect	in	the	theory,	thus	providing	the	reader	with	a	textured	sense	of	respect’s	phenomenal	character.6		
																																																								
6 Note that although for Lewis specifying a theoretical role for a term was supposed to go hand in hand 
with offering a functionalist assay of the T’s denotation, the two are separate moves. When T is a term 
appearing in a phenomenological theory, T’s theoretical role is the role it plays in an overall 
phenomenological, hence non-functional, characterization of T’s denotation. 
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	 This	approach	presupposes	that	there	is	sufficient	uniformity	among	people’s	respect	experiences,	something	that	may	well	be	called	into	question	(Gill	2008,	Sinnott-Armstrong	2008).	Certainly	there	may	be	little	uniformity	at	a	very	fine	grain	of	determinacy.	At	the	same	time,	one	might	hope	that	at	a	sufficient	level	of	generality,	certain	recurring	patterns	might	be	found	interpersonally,	such	that	even	if	different	subjects	find	it	difficult	to	produce	similar	phenomenological	descriptions	of	respect,	when	they	consume	phenomenological	descriptions	of	respect,	some	descriptions	simply	resonate	with	–	command	assent	from	–	many.		In	keeping	with	our	pudding	gambit,	here	we	will	assume	that	there	is	sufficient	uniformity	in	people’s	respect	experiences	to	make	it	possible	to	produce	descriptions	of	those	experiences	–	descriptions	which	do,	or	would,	command	widespread	assent.	The	challenge	is	how	to	characterize	the	common	component	of	felt	respect	for	persons	in	as	substantive	and	informative	a	manner.	Discussions	of	respect	for	persons	in	the	extant	literature	often	start	out	from	Kant’s	remarkably	influential	account	of	it.	Here	too,	however,	philosophers	have	tended	to	focus	on	the	functional	role,	rather	than	phenomenal	character,	Kant	assigned	to	respect.	We	believe,	however,	that	Kant’s	moral	writings	contain	fundamentally	accurate,	if	somewhat	incomplete,	characterizations	of	the	phenomenal	character	of	recognition-respect;	characterizations	that	can	be	more	fully	developed	and	defended	against	various	objections.	In	what	follows,	we	propose	to	build	on	Kant’s	insight	but	in	a	more	overtly	phenomenological	direction	than	is	common	in	the	extant	literature.	We	propose,	in	other	words,	to	develop	a	broadly	Kantian	phenomenology	of	recognition-respect	for	persons.	This	task	will	occupy	us	for	the	next	two	sections.	In	the	final	section,	we	will	briefly	consider	some	outstanding	challenges,	pointing	the	way	for	further	research.7		   	
2.	Kant	on	the	Experience	of	Recognition-Respect:	I.	A	Footnote	in	the	
Groundwork		Kant’s	account	of	the	phenomenology	of	recognition-respect	is	found	primarily	in	his	1797	Doctrine	of	Virtue	(part	II	of	the	Metaphysics	of	Morals),	where	he	discusses																																																									
7 Note well: we do not wish to claim that Kant’s only notion of respect is that of recognition-respect; on the 
contrary, we agree with Darwall (2008), that some of it concerns a kind of moral appraisal-respect. Thus, in 
the second Critique, Kant describes the feeling of respect one experiences upon witnessing the moral merit 
expressed in another’s action as “a tribute that we cannot refuse to pay to merit, whether we want to or not” 
(KpV 5:77). Here the topic appears to be moral appraisal-respect. But the passages we will focus on in the 
main text seem to us to be clearly about recognition-respect.   
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duties	of	virtue	toward	others.	However,	already	in	the	1785	Groundwork	the	feeling	of	respect	is	described	in	some	detail	in	a	long	footnote,	where,	having	characterized	duty	as	“the	necessity	of	an	action	from	respect	for	law”	(G	4:400),	Kant	responds	to	a	potential	worry	that	reference	to	respect	is	merely	“an	obscure	feeling”	that	has	no	place	in	a	purely	rationalist	ethical	theory	(G	4:401n).	It	is	worth	quoting	the	footnote	almost	in	full	(leaving	out	the	first	sentence	that	raises	the	worry),	and	in	two	parts.	Inserting	bracketed	numbers	to	separate	individual	claims	Kant	makes,	the	passage	reads:				[T]hough	[0]	respect	is	a	feeling,	[1]	it	is	not	one	received	by	means	of	influence;	[2]	it	is	instead	a	feeling	self-wrought	(selbstgewirktes)	by	means	of	a	rational	concept	and	[3]	therefore	specifically	different	from	all	feelings	of	the	first	kind,	which	can	be	reduced	to	inclination	or	fear.	[4]	What	I	cognize	(erkenne)	immediately	as	a	law	for	me	I	cognize	with	respect,	[5]	which	signifies	merely	consciousness	of	the	subordination	of	my	will	to	a	law	without	the	mediation	of	other	influences	on	my	sense.	[6]	Immediate	determination	of	the	will	by	means	of	the	law	and	consciousness	of	this	is	called	respect,	[7]	so	that	it	is	regarded	as	an	effect	of	the	law	on	the	subject,	[8]	and	not	as	the	cause	of	the	law.		Among	these	eight	claims,	only	4	and	5	clearly	include	phenomenological	observations.8	However,	they	reveal	what	is	at	the	heart	of	this	feeling	of	respect,	namely,	consciousness	of	the	subordination	of	one’s	will	to	the	law,	not	mediated	by	one’s	antecedent	desires	or	aversions.	This	consciousness	of	subordination,	in	its	fullness,	involves	further	elements:	[9]	Respect	is	properly	the	representation	of	a	worth	that	infringes	upon	my	self-love.	Hence	[10]	there	is	something	that	is	regarded	as	an	object	neither	of	inclination	nor	of	fear,	though	it	has	something	analogous	to	both.	[11]	The	object	of	respect	is	therefore	simply	the	law,	and	[12]	indeed	the	law	that	we	impose	upon	ourselves	and	[13]	yet	[regard	it]	as	necessary	in	itself.		[14]	As	a	law	we	are	subject	to	it	without	consulting	self-love;	[15]	as	imposed	upon	us	by	ourselves	it	is	nevertheless	a	result	of	our	will;	and	[16]	in	the	first	respect	it	has	an	analogy	with	fear,	[17]	in	the	second	with	inclination.	[18]	Any	respect	for	a	person	is	properly	only	respect	for	the	law	(of	integrity	and	so	forth)	of	which	he	gives	us	an	example.	[19]	Because	we	also	regard	enlarging	our	talents	as	a	duty,	[20]	we	represent	a	person	of	talents	also	as,	so	to	speak,	an	example	of	the	
law	(to	become	like	him	in	this	by	practice),	and	[21]	this	is	what	constitutes	our	respect.	[22]	All	so-called	moral	interest	consists	simply	in	respect	for	the	law.	(G	4:401n;	emphases	original).		We	may	set	aside	remarks	18-21,	which	appear	to	concern	moral	appraisal-respect,	and	concentrate	on	the	remaining	elements,	which	concern	recognition-respect	proper.9		
																																																								
8 The second conjunct in 6 is also phenomenological, but it appears to merely recapitulate 5. As for 1-3, 7-
8, and the first conjunct of 6, these appear to concern causal antecedents rather than phenomenal 
constituents of respect.  
9 Recall that appraisal respect is Darwall’s label for the kind of respect which contrasts with recognition-
respect and which is grounded in appreciation of a person’s individual accomplishment or attributes. 
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If	one	revisits	the	sampling	of	phenomenological	observations	cited	in	the	previous	section,	it	is	clear	that	many,	if	not	all,	are	reflected	in	Kant’s	description.	At	the	same	time,	Kant’s	formulations	are	more	specific	in	phenomenological	detail,	thus	yielding	a	distinctively	Kantian	conception	of	respect.	One	can	detect,	moreover,	several	“clusters”	of	salient	phenomenological	elements	from	Kant’s	description.		One	cluster	revolves	around	awareness	of	the	moral	law	in	the	experience	of	respect:		
• Recognition-respect	is	a	particular	mode	of	apprehending	a	person,	in	which	one	pays	attention	to	and	perceives	her	or	him	differently.	In	particular:	
• Recognition-respect	involves	awareness	of	the	moral	law.	[4]	
• Recognition-respect	has	as	its	focus	the	moral	law	and	its	relation	to	one’s	desires	and	aversions.	[11]	
• Recognition-respect	requires	trying	to	apprehend	clearly	the	relation	between	the	moral	law	and	one’s	desires	and	aversions.	[5]	
• Recognition-respect	is	a	representation	of	a	worth	that	infringes	on	one’s	self-love	(one’s	self-regarding	desires	and	aversions).	[9]	
• Recognition-respect	involves	exercising	one’s	agency	by	imposing	the	law	on	oneself.	[12]	This	last	claim	paves	the	way	to	the	core	phenomenal	feature	of	recognition-respect,	namely,	the	subordination	of	one’s	will	to	the	moral	law:		
• Recognition-respect	involves	heeding	the	law	without	consulting	self-love.	[14]	
• That	is,	recognition-respect	involves	actively	subordinating	one’s	desires	and	aversions	to	the	moral	law.	[15]	
• Recognition-respect	is	object-generated	in	the	sense	that	the	moral	law	is	experienced	as	demanding	that	moral	reasons	be	given	normative	priority	over	reasons	grounded	in	self-regarding	desires	and	aversions.	[13]	
• At	the	same	time,	recognition-respect	is	also	an	expression	of	agency:	it	is	a	deliberate,	directed	attention,	rather	than	grabbed	attention,	of	reflective	consideration	and	judgment.	[Implicit	in	12]	In	addition	to	the	active	subordinating	of	one’s	will	to	the	moral	law,	Kant	also	highlights	one’s	awareness	of	doing	so:		
• Recognition-respect	requires	apprehending	a	subordination	relation	obtaining	between	the	moral	law	(and	its	particular	requirements)	and	one’s	desires	and	aversions.	[5]	
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• It	thus	involves	apprehending	the	normative	superiority	of	the	moral	law	(including	its	particular	requirements)	compared	to	reasons	grounded	in	one’s	desires	and	aversions.	[Implicit	in	5]			
• Recognition-respect	involves	the	recognition	of	the	law	directly	determining	one’s	will	without	reference	to	one’s	desires	and	aversions.	[14]	Finally,	Kant	also	makes	two	claims	about	phenomenal	overlaps	between	respect	and	fear,	on	the	one	hand,	and	inclination,	on	the	other:		
• Recognition-respect,	because	it	involves	attending	to	the	subordination	of	one’s	desires	and	aversions	to	a	law	whose	normative	force	is	independent	of	our	will,	is	similar	to	fear	insofar	as	it	has	something	exogenous	(will-independent)	about	its	source.	[14,	16]	
• However,	because	it	also	involves	an	exercise	of	one’s	will	whereby	one	actively	subordinates	desires	and	aversions	to	the	requirements	of	the	moral	law,	recognition-respect	is	also	similar	to	inclination	insofar	as	it	has	something	endogenous	(will-based)	about	its	sources.	[15,	17]	These	similarities	to	fear	and	inclination	may	seem	quite	incidental	to	recognition-respect,	but	they	appear	to	resurface	stubbornly	in	Kant’s	descriptions	of	respect.			
3.	Kant	on	the	Experience	of	Recognition-Respect:	II.	The	Contrastive	
Phenomenology	of	the	Doctrine	of	Virtue		Phenomenological	Ramsey	sentences	offer	one	kind	of	phenomenological	perspective	on	the	experience	of	respect	for	persons.	Another	potentially	instructive	perspective	may	be	provided	by	phenomenal	contrasts,	whereby	core	phenomenal	features	of	respect	are	put	in	sharp	relief	by	the	contraposition	of	the	experience	of	respect	with	the	experience	of	neighboring	moral	experiences.10	By	meticulously	comparing	and	contrasting	the	experience	of	respect	with	the	experience	of	other	moral	emotions	–	such	as	guilt,	shame,	admiration,	and	so	on	–	one	could	inform	our	grasp	of	the	phenomenal	character	distinctive	of	respect	for	persons.		Kant	does	not	offer	anything	like	this	kind	of	comprehensive	web	of	phenomenal	contrasts.	However,	in	Kant’s	final	work	in	moral	philosophy,	the	
Metaphysics	of	Morals,	part	II,	the	Doctrine	of	Virtue,	he	offers	focal	remarks	about	recognition-respect	for	persons,	often	by	juxtaposition	with	a	certain	(ethically																																																									
10 This contrast methodology is heavily used in current discussions of perceptual experience (see notably 
Siegel 2011), as well as so-called cognitive and conative (or agentive) phenomenology (see Kriegel 2015). 
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fundamental)	kind	of	love.	In	that	work,	Kant	sets	forth	a	system	of	mid-level	duties	–	duties	that	mention	act	types,	such	as	beneficence	and	gratitude,	that	are	grounded	in	the	more	abstract,	high-level	categorical	imperative,	and	from	which	one	can	infer	specific	duties	taking	into	account	one’s	particular	circumstance.	He	divides	mid-level	duties	to	others	into	duties	of	love	toward	others	and	duties	of	respect	for	others.11	Importantly,	by	“love”	Kant	does	not	mean	anything	like	romantic	love.	Already	in	the	Groundwork,	he	distinguishes	between	pathos-based	love	(pathologische	Liebe)	and	a	duty-based	love,	which	he	calls	“practical	love”	(G	4:399).	The	former	is	a	passion,	something	that	happens	to	us	rather	than	something	we	directly	control.	In	consequence,	it	makes	no	sense	to	command	such	love.	In	contradistinction,	practical	love	is	something	that	can	very	sensibly	be	commanded,	because	it	is	not	a	passion	but	an	action	–	something	that	we	actively	adopt.	What	we	adopt	is	a	principle	of	action	toward	the	loved	one.	To	that	extent,	practical	love	is	an	action-guiding,	ethically	relevant	emotion	in	the	way	respect	is.	Yet	there	are	several	striking	and	instructive	contrasts	between	the	two.		First	of	all,	the	duty	of	love	requires	most	fundamentally	that	one	adopt	the	maxim	of	making	the	well-being	of	others	an	end	to	be	promoted.	By	contrast,	complying	with	duties	of	respect	requires,	most	fundamentally,	that	one	adopt	the	maxim	of	“limiting	our	self-esteem	by	the	dignity	of	humanity	in	another	person”	(MS	6:449).	The	experience	respecting	another	person	involves	a	felt	exhortation	not	to	use	her	as	a	means	to	our	own	ends.	But	it	does	not	involve	a	felt	exhortation	to	adopt	her	ends	as	our	own,	that	is,	to	commit	ourselves	to	pursuing	these	ends	as	though	they	were	our	own	ends	(though	respect	certainly	appears	to	be	compatible	with	such	commitment	–	see	G	4:430).	By	contrast,	it	is	of	the	essence	of	the	experience	of	practical	love	that	the	other’s	ends	are	taken	on	as	though	they	were	our	own.	This	is	perhaps	the	most	fundamental	difference	between	the	two	experiences.		From	this	fundamental	difference	flows	another	basic	and	quite	abstract	difference:	the	duty	of	respect	embodies	an	essentially	“negative”	requirement,	whereas	the	duty	of	love	embodies	a	“positive”	requirement.	To	that	extent,	the	experience	of	practical	love	toward	a	person	involves	a	felt	motivation	to	engage	in	certain	actions,	whereas	the	experience	of	respecting	a	person	involves	a	felt	motivation	to	refrain	from	certain	actions.	The	experience	of	practical	love	is	that	of	being	motivated	to	go	ahead	and	do	something	for	the	furtherance	of	the	loved	one’s	ends,	whereas	the	experience	of	respect	is	that	of	being	motivated	to	pull	back	and	let	the	respected	one	pursue	her	ends.	
																																																								
11 He also discusses duties to oneself, which we may set aside here.  
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One	suspects,	however,	that	the	contrast	between	recognition-respect	and	practical	love	runs	deeper	than	the	two	states’	relations	to	others’	ends,	and	affects	also	relations	to	means.	For	it	follows	from	the	foregoing	that	when	a	person	we	both	love	and	respect	chooses	what	we	think	is	the	instrumentally	wrong	means	in	the	pursuit	of	her	ultimate	end,	our	love	for	the	person	and	our	respect	for	her	will	issue	conflicting	recommendations:	our	love	for	the	person	makes	us	palpably	want	to	correct	her	choice	of	means,	or	otherwise	to	intervene	to	avoid	the	failure	and	disappointment	we	expect	to	attend	her	ill	thought	out	choice	of	means.	In	contrast,	our	respect	for	the	person	makes	us	feel	the	obligation	to	allow	her	to	“make	her	own	mistakes”	in	pursuing	her	life	autonomously,	despite	the	failure	and	disappointment	we	predict	for	her.	The	point	is	well	articulated	by	Connie	Rosati	in	her	discussion	of	a	related	point	by	Darwall	(2002:	14-16):	[We]	must	leave	room	for	at	least	two	attitudes	that	we	may	take	toward	a	person.	One	attitude	we	may	take	is	concern,	treating	her	as	a	being	with	a	welfare.	A	second	is	respect,	treating	her	as	a	being	with	dignity	–	an	autonomous	agent.	Out	of	respect	for	a	person,	we	may	honor	her	choices	even	when,	out	of	concern	for	her,	we	would	favor	a	different	choice	for	her	sake.	(Rosati	2009:	321)	Rosati’s	“concern”	can	be	thought	of	as	a	phenomenal	component	of	practical	love.	It	is	this	component	that	makes	practical	love	go	beyond	adoption	of	the	loved	one’s	ends	to	a	willingness	(in	some	circumstances)	to	overrule	the	loved	one’s	choice	of	means.	In	its	more	negative,	more	modest	“approach,”	respect	is	unwilling	to	overrule	the	respected	person’s	choice	of	means	–	and	does	not	require	adoption	or	pursuit	of	her	ends	in	the	first	place.		The	feeling	of	modesty	is	in	fact	crucial	to	Kant’s	phenomenological	portrait	of	respect	in	the	Doctrine	of	Virtue.	Recall	that	at	the	heart	of	Kant’s	Groundwork	conception	of	recognition-respect	is	the	idea	of	subordination.	In	a	similar	vein,	in	discussing	in	the	Doctrine	of	Virtue	the	duties	of	respect	toward	others	–	including	duties	to	refrain	from	arrogance,	defamation,	and	ridicule	–	Kant	notes	that	at	the	heart	of	disrespect	for	others	is	a	“lack	of	modesty	in	one’s	claims	to	be	respected	by	others”	(MS	6:462).	This	is	what	Kant	calls	self-conceit	(Eigendünkel).	This	suggests	that	the	phenomenology	of	recognition-respect	involves	the	experience	of	modesty	at	its	core.	In	contrast,	modesty	appears	to	be	entirely	orthogonal	to	love,	including	practical	love:	neither	modesty	nor	immodesty	is	characteristic	of	either	love	or	the	absence	thereof.	Underlying	this	contrast	between	respect	and	love	is	another,	more	general	but	equally	crucial	difference	between	the	two:	respect	is	essentially	egalitarian,	whereas	love	is	essentially	discriminatory.	In	loving	someone	and	committing	oneself	to	pursuing	her	ends	as	though	they	were	one’s	own,	one	is	singling	out	the	
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person,	pulling	her	out	from	the	crowd	so	to	speak,	and	giving	her	personhood	a	special	weight.	In	contrast,	it	is	of	the	very	nature	of	respect	that	recognition-respect	is	owed	to	everyone	equally.	One	may	speculate	that	the	reason	for	this	is	that	it	is	psychologically	possible	for	us	to	negatively	avoid	treating	everybody	as	means	to	our	own	ends,	but	not	psychologically	possible	for	us	to	positively	take	on	
everybody’s	ends.		In	one	striking	passage,	Kant	presents	what	is	perhaps	the	most	dramatic	phenomenal	difference	between	(recognition-)respect	and	(practical-)love:	he	draws	an	analogy	between	laws	of	attraction	and	repulsion	in	the	natural	world	of	physical	causes	with		In	speaking	of	laws	of	duty	(not	laws	of	nature)	and,	among	these,	of	laws	for	human	beings’	external	relations	with	one	another,	we	consider	ourselves	in	a	moral	(intelligible)	world	where,	by	analogy	with	the	physical	world,	attraction	and	repulsion	bind	together	rational	beings	(on	Earth).	The	principle	of	mutual	love	admonishes	them	constantly	to	come	closer	to	one	another;	that	of	respect	they	owe	one	another,	to	keep	themselves	at	a	distance	from	one	another.	.	.	(MS	6:449)		This	passage	comes	immediately	after	Kant	has	indicated	that	one’s	duties	of	love	and	respect	“are	basically	always	united	by	the	law	into	one	duty”	(MS	6:448),	which	he	illustrates	with	the	example	of	beneficence	(Wohltun)	–	a	duty	of	love.	He	remarks	that	the	obligation	to	help	others	in	need	(e.g.,	the	poor)	should	always	be	tempered	by	respect	for	one’s	beneficiary,	“to	spare	him	humiliation	and	maintain	his	respect	for	himself”	(MS	6:448-9).		What	exactly	to	make	of	Kant’s	force	analogy	has	been	a	topic	of	discussion	in	the	secondary	literature.12	One	thing	that	should	be	pointed	out	is	that	the	contrast	between	a	drawing-nearer	force	and	a	distancing	force	parallels	nicely	the	contrast,	discussed	above,	between	the	felt	desire	to	do	something	for	the	other	and	the	felt	need	to	pull	back.	In	any	case,	whatever	one	makes	of	the	force	analogy,	intriguing	as	it	is,	an	interpretation	of	Kant’s	conception	of	recognition-respect	should	do	justice	to	the	idea	that	considerations	of	practical	love	and	respect	are	in	some	ways	distinct,	“pulling”	so	to	speak	in	opposite	directions,	yet	are	importantly	conjoined	in	one’s	moral	involvement	with	others.	The	flavor	of	this	opposing-forces	idea	should	be	preserved	in	articulating	Kant’s	(and,	we	would	add,	Kantian)	phenomenology	of	recognition-respect.	Indeed,	we	may	think	of	this	as	constraint	on	an	account	of	respect	qualifying	as	properly	Kantian.		In	conclusion,	we	have	pointed	out	six	phenomenal	contrasts	between	recognition-respect	and	practical	love,	as	they	arise	from	Kant’s	discussion	in	the																																																									
12 See, for example, Baron 1997 and Johnson 1997.  
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Doctrine	of	Virtue.	They	are:	(1)	refraining	from	using	the	other	as	means	to	our	own	ends	(respect)	versus	committing	to	taking	on	the	other’s	ends	as	though	they	were	our	own	(love);	(2)	negative	felt	demand	to	pull	back	(respect)	versus	positive	felt	demand	to	act	(love);	(3)	a	felt	need	to	let	the	other	pursue	her	ends	using	the	means	she	deems	suitable	(respect)	versus	a	felt	desire	to	overrule	the	other’s	choice	of	means,	the	better	to	serve	the	pursuit	of	her	ends	(love);	(4)	the	felt	exercise	of	modesty	(respect)	versus	the	complete	absence	of	either	modesty	or	immodesty	(love);	(5)	an	egalitarian	feeling	of	treating	all	persons	the	same	(respect)	versus	the	discriminating	feeling	that	gives	some	person	a	special	treatment	(love);	(6)	the	felt	“repulsion”	keeping	one	at	a	distance	from	the	object	of	one’s	experience	(respect)	versus	the	felt	“attraction”	drawing	one	closer	to	the	object	of	one’s	experience	(love).			
4.	Filling	out	the	Kantian	Phenomenology	of	Recognition-Respect		Unfortunately,	the	Doctrine	of	Virtue	does	not	contain	a	passage	that	neatly	condenses	all	of	Kant’s	main	phenomenological	observations	about	the	experience	of	recognition-respect	(the	way	the	Groundwork	footnote	discussed	in	§2	did).	However,	with	a	schematic	characterization	of	Kant’s	phenomenal-contrast-based	account	of	recognition-respect	now	before	us,	we	may	try	to	articulate	a	Ramsey	sentence	that	captures	those	observations	as	they	come	across	in	the	Doctrine	of	
Virtue.	We	take	up	this	task	in	the	next	section.		Before	starting,	though,	it	is	worth	keeping	in	mind	that	Kant’s	primary	concern	here	is	with	the	phenomenology	of	the	complex	attitude	of	respect,	and	not	just	the	phenomenology	of	acting	in	ways	that	are	merely	outwardly	respectful,	regardless	of	one’s	attitude	toward	the	object	of	such	outward	behavior.	There	is	a	kind	of	“performative	respect”	we	show	someone	when	we	are	polite	toward	her,	avoid	rude	or	overtly	inconsiderate	behavior	toward	her,	and	so	on.	Such	behaviors	are	nonetheless	compatible	with	having	arrogant	or	ridiculing	private	thoughts	about	the	person.	For	Kant,	this	would	still	be	a	case	of	self-conceit	and	a	failure	to	recognition-respect	the	person.		Our	task	in	this	section,	then,	is	to	develop	a	more	determinate	conception	of	Kantian	recognition-respect	that	builds	on	Kant’s	own	schematic	characterization	but	may	also	go	beyond	it.	To	make	the	experience	of	respect	vivid	in	our	minds	during	the	discussion,	we	begin	with	two	vignettes	that	we	take	to	be	representative	of	at	least	some	common,	indeed	typical,	experiences	of	recognition-respect.	Now,	in	
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an	agent	who	has	the	virtue	of	respect,	her	actions	will	routinely	express	her	respect	for	others	automatically	and	without	effort,	in	a	way	that	may	make	the	associated	phenomenology	relatively	muted.	Our	cases	are	therefore	ones	of	effortful	respect,	respect	that	does	not	comes	easy	to	the	person	doing	the	respecting.	The	point	is	to	make	more	manifest	the	phenomenology	of	recognition-respect	experienced	on	some	occasion	of	recognizing	a	duty	toward	others.		Case	1:	Jones	is	a	professor	teaching	a	course	in	philosophy	to	first-year	undergraduates.	During	one	particular	class	session,	he	responds	to	a	student’s	question	in	a	curt	manner,	which	conveys	a	dismissive	attitude	toward	the	question	and	the	student.	Later	that	day,	in	thinking	about	that	class	session,	and,	in	particular,	about	his	handling	of	the	student’s	question,	he	feels	sheepish	and	slightly	ashamed	of	his	curt,	dismissive	reply,	which	now	strikes	him	as	telegraphing	a	sense	of	intellectual	superiority	over	the	student.	He	realizes	that	his	manner	conveyed	a	lack	of	respect	for	the	student	–	something	he	(mostly	successfully)	aims	to	avoid	–	and	that	on	this	occasion	he	was	just	too	anxious	about	keeping	to	the	course	syllabus	and	pressing	ahead	with	his	lecture.	More	than	that,	Prof.	Jones	is	well	aware	that	he	is	sometimes	mildly	irritated	by	this	student,	whose	questions	tend	to	be	off	the	mark.	Jones	comes	to	think	that	the	combination	of	his	feeling	toward	this	particular	student	and	the	felt	pressure	to	get	through	course	material	is	what	prompted	his	manner	of	reply.	As	a	result	of	these	reflections,	Jones	vows	to	himself	that	he	won’t	let	such	pressure	get	to	him	when	dealing	with	students	in	his	classes.	He	is	now	primed	to	put	his	vow	into	practice,	having	wallowed	in	his	shame	suitably	long	that	he	feels	a	strong	motivation	to	avoid	the	same	moral	mistake	in	the	future.	In	the	very	next	session,	the	same	student	asks	a	question	about	the	course	material,	and	not	betraying	fundamental	misunderstanding.	But	this	time	Jones	puts	aside	competing	considerations	and	attends	patiently	to	the	question,	delivering	a	thoughtful	and	cheerful	reply	at	a	proper	level	of	sophistication	for	being	understood	by	the	student	and	the	class.	Moreover,	he	does	so	while	genuinely	inhabiting	a	feeling	of	respect	for	this	student	as	a	person	whose	possible	intellectual	limitations	do	not	make	him	any	less	of	a	person.	Overall,	Jones’s	demeanor	conveys	a	proper	attitude	of	modesty	in	answering	the	student,	thus	deliberately	overcoming	any	negative	feelings	he	may	have	toward	this	student’s	philosophical	acumen.		Case	2:	Prof.	Jones	is,	by	the	way,	a	fresh	tenure-track	hire	of	his	department’s,	and	often	discusses	topics	of	mutual	interest	with	his	senior	colleague	Smith.	One	day,	over	lunch,	they	end	up	discussing	the	wider	issue	of	what	one	might	want	out	of	an	academic	career	as	a	philosopher,	sharing	with	each	other	that	although	intellectual	illumination	and	philosophical	wisdom	are	what	they	ultimately	value	
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more,	the	desire	for	professional	recognition	and	success	can	often	be	felt	more	violently.	Smith	then	offers	Jones	a	number	of	wise	tips	she	has	garnered	or	formulated	to	herself	over	the	years	–	tips	essentially	about	how	to	avoid	the	temptations	of	professional	vanity	when	the	latter	comes	at	the	expense	of	pursuing	that	which	they	both	just	claimed	to	genuinely	value	more.	Toward	the	end	of	the	lunch,	however,	as	the	discussion	veers	back	to	more	mundane	matters,	Jones	proudly	and	joyfully	reveals	to	Smith	that	he	has	been	approached	to	apply	for	a	prestigious	fellowship;	the	fellowship	would	force	him	to	work	on	a	topic	he	is	not	really	interested	in,	he	says,	but	on	the	other	hand	it	involves	spending	a	semester	at	a	top	department,	where	he	will	make	contact	with	some	of	the	leading	figures	in	his	area,	and	the	salary	is	higher	to	boot.	Smith	finds	odd	the	discrepancy	between	Jones’	stated	life	goals	in	the	conversation	they	just	had	and	the	unbridled	enthusiasm	he	shows	for	this	fellowship.	She	is	about	to	dampen	his	excitement	with	a	pregnant	remark,	but	just	as	she	is	about	to	do	so,	something	holds	her	back.	She	contemplates	the	notions	that	his	youth	may	make	him	hungrier	for	validation	than	she	can	relate	to,	and	that	perhaps	he	knows	best	just	how	much	prestige	he	must	chase	in	order	to	calm	down	the	desire	for	it	and	be	able	to	concentrate	better	on	what	genuinely	matters	to	him	most.	She	even	considers	that,	all	said	and	done,	he	may	ultimately	have	ends	different	from	hers,	and	that’s	okay	too	–	“people	are	just	different,”	she	tells	herself.	She	warmly	wishes	him	success	in	his	application	and	congratulates	him	for	being	approached	in	the	first	place,	remarking	that	it	is	a	sign	of	a	rising	notoriety	and	that	he	should	be	proud	of	himself.		Reflection	on	these	scenarios,	and	keeping	in	mind	the	phenomenal	features	brought	into	sharper	relief	through	the	contrast	with	practical	love,	we	offer	a	phenomenological	portrait	of	recognition-respect	for	persons	that	highlights	four	main	groups	of	observation.		A	first	and	paramount	group	of	phenomenological	observations	pertain	to	the	central	role	of	modesty	in	recognition-respect	(which	comes	across	most	vividly	in	Case	1):	
• Recognition-respect	for	persons	(respect,	hereafter)	is	a	particular	mode	of	apprehending	another	person	in	which	one	pays	attention	to	and	perceives	her	or	him	differently.	In	particular:			
• The	attention	one	pays	to	the	other	person	is	an	expression	of	one’s	modesty.13		
• The	modesty	in	question	has	as	its	focus	oneself	and	the	other	person.																																																									
13 For defense of an account of modesty in terms of attention, see Bommarito 2013.  
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• Respect	as	modesty	requires	trying	to	apprehend	clearly	a	particular	relation	between	oneself	and	the	other	person.		
• Respect	as	modesty	requires	apprehending,	more	specifically,	a	relation	of	equality	between	oneself	and	the	other.		This	modesty	is	not	experienced	as	spontaneous,	let	alone	groundless.	Rather,	it	is	experienced	as	grounded	in	a	special	intrinsic	worth	that	the	respected	person	possesses	–	what	we	might	call,	following	Kant	(G	4:434),	dignity:		
• Respect	as	modesty	is	a	representation	of	a	worth	possessed	by	the	other	person	as	a	person	with	dignity	equal	to	one’s	own	dignity.		
• Respect	as	modesty	is	a	worth	that	infringes	on	one’s	self-love	and	strikes	down	one’s	self-conceit.	
• Respect	as	modesty	requires	recognition	of	the	dignity	of	the	other	as	directly	determining	one’s	will	regardless	of	one’s	desires	and	aversions.		
• Respect	for	persons	is	thus	object-generated	in	the	sense	that	representation	of	the	dignity	of	the	other	is	experienced	as	demanding	that	consideration	of	this	dignity	be	given	normative	priority	over	considerations	of	self-love.		
• At	the	same	time,	respect	is	also	an	expression	of	agency:	it	is	deliberate,	directed	attention,	rather	than	grabbed	attention.		
• Respect	involves	exercising	one’s	agency	in	that	“I	keep	myself	within	my	own	bounds”	(MS	6:450)	in	the	sense	that	I	refrain	from	unjustly	elevating	myself	over	others	by	denigrating	their	worth.14			In	addition,	there	is	an	important	group	of	phenomenological	observations	pertaining	to	the	role	of	respect	in	relating	to	ends	and	means	(highlighted	by	Case	2):	
• Respect	for	persons	involves	a	keen	sense	of	when	one	is	dealing	with	another	in	just	the	way	one	does	in	part	because	of	what	one	expects	to	obtain	from	the	other	in	virtue	of	so	dealing.	
• To	that	extent,	respecting	a	person	involves	being	aware	of	seeing	her,	at	least	in	part,	only	qua	means	to	our	own	end.	
• Respect	involves	the	feeling	of	overcoming	the	temptation	to	see	others	only	in	terms	of	what	they	afford	oneself	in	one’s	pursuit	of	one’s	own	ends.	
• Respect	involves	a	degree	of	emotional	acceptance	of	others’	goals	and	ends,	even	when	they	differ	in	important	ways	from	one’s	own.	
• Respect	also	involves	an	element	of	acceptance	of	others’	chosen	means.																																																									
14 Our continuation of the quoted remark is a gloss on the remainder of the sentence, which in full reads: “I 
keep myself within my own bounds so as not to detract anything from the worth that the other, as a human 
being is authorized to put upon himself.”  
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• Respect	as	acceptance,	too,	is	grounded	in	an	apprehension	of	the	other	as	equal	to	oneself	at	the	deepest	level.		
• It	is	also	grounded	in	full	appreciation	of	the	distinctness	or	otherness	of	the	other	–	the	fact	that	she	harbors	an	internal	life	which	is	ultimately	separate	from	one’s	own.		Finally,	there	are	also	two	phenomenological	observations	worth	making	about	an	affective	valence	involved	in	the	experience	of	respect:		
• Respect,	because	it	requires	subordinating	self-love	and	striking	down	self-conceit,	involves	a	negative	feeling	of	humility.		
• At	the	same	time,	because	it	involves	a	representation	of	one’s	equality	with	others,	respect	typically	involves	also	a	positive,	almost	cathartic	feeling	of	being	in	community	and	brotherhood	with	other	human	beings.		As	before,	in	order	to	capture	the	theoretical	role	of	recognition-respect	for	persons	in	the	theory,	we	may	construct	a	Ramsey	sentence	that	includes	these	observations	(plus	presumably	additional	ones)	asserting	the	existence	of	an	attitude	that	satisfies	all	or	most	of	these	elements.			 It	might	be	objected	that	our	portrait	of	respect	is	much	too	complex	and	over-intellectualizing,	casting	respect	as	an	incredibly	sophisticated	emotion	few	would	actually	be	able	to	experience.	In	response,	we	would	like	to	stress	two	points.	First,	and	most	importantly,	while	some	of	the	descriptors	just	used	deploy	high-level	concepts,	it	does	not	follow	that	a	person	needs	to	possess	the	relevant	concepts	to	just	experience	respect.	The	reason	is	that,	in	general,	a	person	need	not	be	in	a	position	to	articulate	and	accurately	conceptualize	every	experience	she	is	capable	of	undergoing.	Second,	however,	we	would	like	to	insist	that	recognition-respect	really	is	one	of	the	most	intellectual	emotions	in	the	standard	human	psychological	repertoire,	one	that	is	indeed	much	less	frequently	experienced	than,	say,	guilt	or	joy.		
4.	Outstanding	Challenges	and	Further	Research		We	have	attempted	to	offer	a	phenomenological	(first-personal)	rather	than	psychological	(third-personal)	characterization	of	Kantian	respect	for	persons,	as	it	comes	through	both	in	the	Groundwork	and	in	the	Doctrine	of	Virtue.	Naturally,	the	above	is	just	an	initial	sketch,	almost	an	illustration,	of	what	a	phenomenological	
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approach	to	respect	would	look	like.	We	want	to	close	with	discussion	of	three	major	challenges	to	the	project	that	may	open	fruitful	avenues	of	research	into	the	phenomenology	of	respect.			 The	first	and	most	straightforward	challenge	is	that	Kant’s	phenomenological	characterization	of	respect	is	inadequate.	In	particular,	several	scholars	have	argued	that	Kant	casts	respect	as	overly	abstract	and	intellectual.	One	immediate	worry	is	that	Kant	often	characterizes	respect	as	intentionally	directed,	in	the	first	instance,	not	at	persons	but	at	the	law,	and	to	that	extent	gets	wrong	the	intentional	content	of	respect	(Drummond	2006:	2).	As	Kant	himself	puts	it,	“every	respect	for	a	person	is	properly	only	respect	for	the	law	.	.	.	of	which	gives	us	an	example”	(G	4:401n).	In	response,	one	might	allow	that	respect	for	persons	is	intentionally	directed	at	persons	after	all,	but	is	so	directed	in	virtue	of	being	directed	at	the	law	(somewhat	as	an	auditory	perception	can	be	directed	at	a	bus	in	virtue	of	being	directed	at	the	sound	of	the	bus’s	engine).	Some	philosophers	have	charged,	however,	Kant’s	focus	on	respecting	persons	only	in	virtue	of	respecting	their	humanity,	or	only	in	virtue	of	their	exemplifying	the	law,	is	too	“cold”	and	impersonal.	The	problem	is	that	Kant’s	conception	of	respect	for	persons	fails	to	do	justice	to	a	commonsense	conception,	grounded	in	everyday,	ordinary	phenomenology,	according	to	which	respecting	persons	is	a	matter	of	having	an	attitude	toward	them	that	“takes	in”	the	wholeness	of	the	person	as	particular	agents	with	particular	aims,	interests,	and	concerns	(Noggle	1999).	Robin	Dillon	nicely	summarizes	the	abstractness	objection	when	she	writes,	concerning	the	Kantian	conception	of	respect	for	persons,	that	it	abstracts	from	all	particularities,	regarding	the	details	of	our	selves	as	contingencies	irrelevant	to	our	intrinsic	moral	worth.	The	morally	significant	feature	of	persons	on	this	view	is	something	abstract	and	generic,	not	what	distinguishes	one	individual	from	another	but	what	makes	us	all	indistinguishably	equal.	An	individual	human	being	is	an	object	of	respect	only	insofar	as	she	is	an	instance	of	the	universal	type,	‘being	with	the	capacity	for	rationally	autonomous	moral	agency.’	It	is,	in	the	words	of	the	categorical	imperative,	the	‘humanity	in	us’	that	matters	morally	and	so	calls	for	respect.	(Dillon	1992:	116)	Because	the	version	of	Kantian	respect	under	scrutiny	here	is	focused	on	an	abstract	feature	that	all	persons	share,	it	is	claimed	that	the	attitude	of	respect	is	“distant,”	“cool,”	“detached,”	as	well	as	being	indiscriminate,	as	if	the	particular	person	who	has	the	abstract	property	now	being	respected	by	one	could	be	switched	out	for	any	other	particular	person	and	one’s	respect	would	remain	exactly	the	same	(and	equally	appropriate).		 There	are	two	possible	approaches	to	this	challenge.	One	is	to	try	to	show	that	Kant’s	conception	of	respect	is	much	less	abstract	and	impersonal	than	scholars	have	claimed	(see	Bagnoli	2003).	The	other	is	to	concede	the	generic	and	
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indiscriminate	character	of	Kantian	respect	but	defend	it	as	a	fitting	reflection	of	nature	of	recognition-respect.	We	are	tempted	by	this	latter	approach.	In	fact,	we	suspect	that	authors	who	demand	a	more	“particularist”	conception	of	recognition-respect	will	find	that	the	latter	ends	up	collapsing	into	practical	love.	If	one	is	impressed	by	the	need	to	distinguish	love	and	respect	(or,	more	generally,	one	moral	emotion	that	brings	people	closer	and	makes	the	agent	adopt	the	other’s	ends	as	her	own	and	another	moral	emotion	that	protects	the	separateness	of	people	and		makes	agent	avoid	treating	others	as	means),	then	one	must	cast	respect	as	indeed	a	rather	abstract	and	indiscriminating	attitude.	This	is	of	course	just	a	sketch	of	a	response.	We	do	not	pretend	to	have	argued	for	it	with	these	rudimentary	remarks;	merely	to	have	pointed	in	the	direction	of	response	to	which	we	are	attracted.			 A	related	challenge	is	that	even	if	Kant’s	phenomenology	of	respect	is	broadly	accurate,	it	cannot	by	itself	be	morally	foundational,	requiring	instead	supplementation	by	more	“pathos-based”	moral	emotions,	such	as	love,	empathy,	and	care	(see	Dillon	1992,	Sherman	1998).	The	objection	may	be	put	impressionistically	as	follows:	an	ethical	system	based	entirely	on	a	force	of	“repulsion”	that	keeps	people	at	a	distance	is	a	somewhat	grim	and	uninviting	system.	Surely	care	and	concern	for	the	happiness	of	others	must	play	a	role	in	a	comprehensive	ethical	theory.		 In	response,	we	can	only	agree	with	the	objector’s	sentiment.	But	we	do	not	agree	that	Kant	has	missed	this	point.	His	very	distinction	between	duties	of	respect	and	duties	of	love	is	indicative	of	his	sensitivity	to	it.	Duties	of	practical	love	include	beneficence	(or	“good-doing”	–	Wholtun)	and	sympathetic	feeling.	The	duty	of	sympathetic	feeling	is	an	“indirect”	duty	in	the	sense	that	fulfilling	it	plays	a	significant	role	in	providing	one	with	information	and	motivation	to	fulfill	one’s	duty	of	beneficence.	Proper	sympathetic	identification	with	another’s	plight	puts	one	in	touch	with	factors	about	her	or	his	situation	that	are	morally	relevant	in	determining	how	one	might	be	of	help.	Kant	claims	that	sympathetic	feeling	is	a	natural	instinct,	which,	when	cultivated,	can	serve	to	motivate	one	to	perform	acts	of	beneficence	that	“representation	of	duty	alone	might	not	accomplish”	(MS	6:457).	So	unlike	duties	of	respect,	fulfilling	one’s	duty	of	beneficence	toward	others	will	typically	involve	sympathetic	feeling.	Importantly,	because	the	duty	of	beneficence	is	an	“imperfect”	duty,	it	allows	for	latitude	in	complying	with	it,	and	so	the	phenomenology	of	beneficence	will	typically	not	involve	a	felt	demand,	or	at	least	not	one	of	the	same	strength	as	experienced	in	cases	of	recognition	respect.	Although	in	cases	of	close	personal	relationships	duties	of	love	and	of	respect	tend	to	“fuse,”	it	is	important	in	Kant’s	scheme	that	the	differences	between	them	not	be	lost	in	one’s	theorizing.	It	remains	that	a	complete	understanding	of	Kant’s	moral	
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phenomenology	requires	a	more	precisely	articulated	picture	of	the	complementary	roles	of	pathos-based	moral	emotions	(paradigmatically:	love)	and	pathos-free	ones	(paradigmatically:	respect).		 A	different	challenge	to	the	present	project	is	that	the	phenomenal	character	of	conscious	experiences	of	respect	is	a	morally	insignificant	aspect	of	respect.	In	one	version,	the	objection	may	be	that	feeling	respect	toward	a	person	is	a	highly	energy-consuming	thing,	requiring	as	it	does	apprehending	the	person	the	right	way	and	framing	one’s	relation	to	her	in	a	very	specific	way.	We	could	certainly	not	be	expected	to	enter	this	emotionally	taxing	state	every	time	we	crossed	a	person	on	the	street.	If	so,	moral	life	cannot	be	governed	by	this	kind	of	state.	Some	other	way	of	negotiating	our	social	life	morally	would	have	to	be	devised.			 Our	tentative	response	has	two	parts.	On	the	one	hand,	we	would	like	to	concede	the	point	about	the	emotional	cost	of	constant	jolting	into	a	state	of	experienced	respect.	What	should	morally	govern	our	interactions	with	others,	on	our	view,	is,	ideally,	a	trained-in	virtue	of	respect	(or	“respectfulness”).	This	virtue	of	respect	is	best	thought	of	as	a	cluster	of	automatized,	unconscious	dispositions,	and	to	that	extent	calls	for	a	psychological,	third-person,	functional-role-based	characterization	rather	than	our	phenomenological,	first-person,	phenomenal-character-based	one.	At	the	same	time,	we	insist	that	while	some	of	the	manifestations	constitutive	of	the	relevant	disposition	are	behavioral,	others	are	experiential,	and	are	just	as	constitutive.	A	person	who	consistently	acted	toward	other	persons	in	all	the	ways	required	by	recognition-respect,	but	whose	internal	experience	as	she	did	so	conformed	to	none	of	the	phenomenological	observations	cited	above,	could	hardly	be	properly	described	as	having	the	virtue	of	respect.	(Thus	a	respectful	zombie	would	appear	to	be	inconceivable!)	To	that	extent,	a	complete	functional	characterization	of	the	virtue	of	respect	presupposes	a	phenomenological	characterization	of	the	experience	of	respect.	It	remains,	however,	that	a	fuller	account	of	the	respective	roles	of	respect-as-experience	and	respect-as-virtue	in	a	Kantian	ethics	would	be	required	for	a	defense	of	the	significance	of	a	phenomenology	of	respect	for	our	grasp	on	moral	action.	
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